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Abstract 
In order to develop effective policies to improve conditions for people working 
in the informal sector of the economy, it is crucial to understand how that 
sector arises, operates and relates to the state. This paper analyses the 
informal sector in Ghana from this perspective, drawing insight from a wide range 
of sources such as radio and newspaper accounts to overcome the dearth of 
official information on the subject. The analysis shows the limits of various 
approaches that have aimed at revamping the informal sector. It puts the 
case for a more comprehensive approach to the informal sector than has 
been evident in previous policies towards the urban economy. 
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The Local Context 
The roar of bulldozers, the clutter of the hammer, the rant of armed policemen, 
the screams of women, the wails of men and the tears of children – these are the 
images of forced eviction1 in urban Ghana. Mayors looking on unconcerned and 
journalists assaulted for trying to report on the evictions sometimes 
complete the picture. The massive number of people who live in slums and 
work in the informal economy in Ghana live in constant fear of forced 
eviction. Outside their homes, they are chased away from the streets and 
sidewalks where they eke out a living. At work and at home, those in the 
informal sector are under recurrent attack. 
 
The precarious existence of these marginalised people deserves careful 
study because it has become chronic, attained pandemic proportions and has 
implications for governance in Ghana. Also, a study of the dynamics of people in 
the informal sector would help complement similar studies elsewhere in Africa 
(e.g. Potts, 2007; 2006; 2005), South America (e.g. Crossa, 2009) and beyond 
(e.g. Cabannes et al., 2010; Peters, 2009), helping to compare and contrast 
the experiences and to develop more effective urban policies than forced 
evictions.  
 
Earlier efforts to study problems such as forced evictions have often looked 
from the legal perspective, asking whether the state has the right to evict or 
whether the evictees have the right to squat. A major weakness of this law-heavy 
analytical framework is that it parochialises the forced eviction problem into a 
situation in which, if A has a right, B cannot have the same right. As the mayor 
                                                 
1 Following the definition of the United Nations Committee for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), forced evictions, as used in this 
paper involves ‘the permanent or temporary removal against their will of 
individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land 
which they occupy’ (CESCR, 1997). 
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of Accra puts it, if the victims have a right to squat, the city authorities too have 
a right to evict them (GNA, 2009).  
 
Fortunately, a few recent studies (e.g. Mensah, 2006; Yeboah, 1998) have 
examined the problem in a broader light. However, these studies tend to 
examine the informal economy and slums as though they were different 
phenomena. For instance, Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah (2008) and Ofori (2007) 
analysed forced evictions of hawkers but did not examine where these hawkers 
live and how where they live affects what they do. Grant (2009), on the other 
hand, analysed forced evictions of slum dwellers without looking at how the slum 
dwellers make a living. These approaches pay insufficient attention to the 
close connections between where victims of evictions live and work. 
Often, the nature of work these people do determines where they live 
and vice versa (e.g. Tipple, 1994; 1995; 2006; Yankson, 2000). Nima, a 
suburb in Accra, is a case in point. Field surveys in the area by George 
Owusu and his colleagues (2008) show that it is predominantly inhabited 
by informal workers. More generally, the global survey of slum conditions 
by the United Nations Human Settlement Program (UN-Habitat, 2003, 
p.xxvi) revealed that:  
 
The majority of slum dwellers in developing country cities earn their 
living from informal sector activities located either within or outside 
slum areas, and many informal sector entrepreneurs whose 
operations are located within slums have clienteles extending to the 
rest of the city. 
 
 Therefore, though these earlier studies have been useful in shedding light on 
forced evictions and the nature of the informal sector in Ghana, there is an urgent 
need to study forced evictions and the informal sector from a broader 
perspective, one that brings the two targets of forced evictions together.  
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This paper is a preliminary effort in this direction. It moves our understanding of 
forced evictions forward by using a broader political economic framework to 
analyse the informal sector and the problems of forced eviction. Some of the 
evidence that supports the analysis is drawn first hand from newspaper accounts, 
not published in more academic texts. Such sources are current and may 
not be widely known among scholars. Researchers specialising in African 
cities, like Prof. Saad Yahya (2006, p.127-129), have endorsed this approach 
because, generally, official records on slums and the informal economy are 
deliberately diluted and restricted. Sometimes too, officials are, for obvious 
reasons like taxation, denied information by the slum dwellers and those in the 
informal economy. Accounts by local journalists can provide more valuable 
information, although there is a potential problem of bias in reportage. In 
order to minimise this problem, the accounts are drawn from a variety of 
newspapers - national, regional, private and state owned – and these primary 
sources are complemented by drawing on the few existing systematic studies 
on this subject.  
 
 
The Wider Context: Informality Everywhere 
Informality can be found in several aspects of urban life. ‘Informal’ 
means opposed to the laid down rules or the accepted norms. In Africa, 
where the rate of urbanisation is one of the highest globally, informality 
is most evident in how people obtain shelter (slum conditions) and earn 
a living (informal economy). With a staggering 46 per cent of the urban 
population in Africa living in slums, African urbanists sometimes infer 
that mega-cities equals mega-slums (UN-Habitat, 2008b, p. 26). 
Nowhere on the continent are slums as prevalent as in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where an estimated 62 per cent of the urban population lives in 
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slums (UN, 2008).  The slum experience is, however, not exclusively 
African. 
 
It is estimated that, worldwide, 1 billion people - or 3 out of every 10 
persons who reside in cities - are living in slums. The incidence of slums 
varies between developed, developing and least developed countries. The 
UN-Habitat (2003) calculates that 43 per cent of the aggregate urban 
population of developing countries lives in slums while, for countries 
classified as ‘least developed’, as much as 8 out of every 10 urban 
citizens lives in slums (UN-Habitat, 2003).  On a daily basis, it is 
estimated that 120,000 people are added to slums in developing 
countries (Cities Alliance, 2008, p. 1). Mike Davis (2006) contends that 
we live on a planet of slums. Finer disaggregation of the data shows that 
the incidence of slums is highest in female-headed households. In Haiti, 
for instance, an estimated 60 per cent of female-headed households live 
in slum conditions (UN-Habitat, 2008a, p.xiii). A ground breaking study 
by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) has provided rich 
qualitative evidence of the various ways in which women and children in 
Asia, America and Africa suffer from the life threatening conditions of 
slums (see COHRE, 2008).  
 
A connection between slum dwelling and work in the informal economy 
may be inferred. Statistical information on the informal economy is 
relatively underdeveloped, however. The little that exists suggests that, 
as with slums, the problem is more pervasive in poor continents. For 
instance, an estimated 54 per cent of all employment in Africa is in the 
informal economy, while in sub-Saharan Africa, 78 per cent of all non- 
agricultural employment is in the informal economy. Conversely, in the 
Highly Industrialised Countries, only 3 per cent of employment is in the 
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informal economy (UN-Habitat, 2003, p.103). With informality being such 
a significant feature of African cities, the informality itself needs further 
discussion. 
 
The Informal Sector: A Conceptual Analysis 
 
The informal sector, as used in this paper, broadly refers to the slum2 and the 
informal economy. The two are organically related. While not all informal 
workers live in slums, their low and irregular incomes make the slums their 
typical living place. The concepts of ‘slum’ and ‘informal economy’, 
however, have distinct meanings.  
 
The UN-Habitat (2003, p.103) regards slums3 as ‘residential areas that lack 
adequate access to water and sanitation, security of tenure, poor structural 
quality of housing and insufficient living area’. Elsewhere, it (UN-Habitat, 2004, 
p.7) adds that slums “…include also the vast informal settlements that are 
quickly becoming the most visual expression of urban poverty. The quality of 
dwellings in such settlements varies from the simplest shack to permanent 
structures, while access to water, electricity, sanitation and other basic services 
                                                 
2 University of London Professor Alan Gilbert (2007) has written a helpful critique of the 
uncritical use of this term. He warns that ‘slum’ is a dangerous term because it has 
negative connotations, creates false hopes that such settlements could be completely 
removed, and tempts mayors and some planners to try to end such settlements overnight.  
However, as Prof. Gilbert correctly notes, alternative terms like ‘informal housing’, 
‘irregular settlement’ and ‘spontaneous housing’ do not convey the dynamics in such 
settlements either (Gilbert, 2007, p.705). Gilbert (2007, p.709) argues that the campaign 
to end slums should be renamed the campaign for ‘better shelter’. This phrase saves us 
from the negative connotation associated with ‘slum’. However, indicators for ‘better 
shelter’ have to be developed (perhaps using the UN ‘decent housing’ criteria) to make it 
possible for measurement purposes. That task is, evidently, too big for this paper.  In my 
use of ‘slum’ in this paper, I have tried to show the complexity it entails. However, readers 
should note the limitation to its use.   
3 The history and changing meaning of the term can be found in Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums (Davis, 
2006, pp. 21-22).  
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and infrastructure tends to be limited. Such settlements are referred to by a wide 
range of names and include a variety of tenurial arrangements”. The first 
conception emphasises the physical characteristics of slums while the second 
notes the socio-economic dimension. Slum settlements are a physical expression 
of urban poverty which, in turn, reinforces the squalid condition of the slum 
settlements.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 1 - Diagrammatic representation of the UN-Model to Slum Analysis 
 
 
Source: UN-Habitat 2004    
 
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the physical and socio-economic 
characteristics of slums. Poor access to water, inadequate sanitation, poor 
quality of houses and insecurity of housing tenure are mutually reinforcing 
and are often worsened by income poverty. Slums powerfully bring to the 
fore the organic link between where people live and how they earn a 
living.  
 
This relationship between where people live and where they earn a living 
hinges on the observation that most people working in the informal 
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sector of the economy are poor. They seek to obtain cheaper 
accommodation than the type that exists in the formal sector and they 
work in the informal sector where they can usually avoid the costs 
associated with registering business in the formal sector (UN-Habitat, 
2003). They can more easily enter and exit the informal economy because it 
is generally unregulated. Work in the informal economy is usually labour 
intensive, uses simple technology and operates on a small scale. The type of work 
in this sector varies. It includes self employed non-wage labour and wage labour 
employed below the minimum wage with little or no benefit from the protections 
and social security in the formal sector. The informal economy cuts across 
different occupations - primary, secondary and tertiary – but in all cases the 
working conditions of labour are harsh (Sandbrook and Arn, 1977; Trager, 1987; 
Potts, 2007).  
 
It may readily be conceded that, in practice, the distinction between the 
formal and informal economy is not always sharp. One sector may have some 
features of another and some people may work in both sectors at the same or 
different times. For instance, an informal economy worker could be a 
subcontractor of a formal sector contractor (International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions [ICFT], 2004) or a retailer for a wholesaler. Also, a person in the 
informal economy may be able to move ‘upwards’ into the formal sector (Asiedu 
and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). Similarly, a worker in the formal economy worker 
could be working in the informal economy on a part-time basis. The common 
feature of informal sector activity is that it is not covered by regulation and 
protection. For that reason, it is also not usually recorded in formal statistics. 
 
These concepts of slum-dwelling and informality are broadly consistent with 
the definitions used by the Government of Ghana (GoG). For instance, the 
conception of slums is consistent with the definition in the National Housing 
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Strategy of Ghana (see Jack and Braimah, 2004, pp.14-15). For that reason, 
housing studies in Ghana (e.g. Grant, 2009) adopt the UN-Habitat conception and 
statistics. The concept of ‘informal sector’ was first used by Keith Hart (1973) to 
describe urban economic activities in Ghana. Later, the International Labour 
Organisation changed the term informal sector to informal economy (Trager, 
1987). Although, the concept has expanded over time, it has not been purged of 
its original meaning.  
 
Using these concepts, it is estimated that 45 per cent of the urban 
population in Ghana lives in slums (UN-Habitat, 2009). These slum 
conditions could be any of four types of settlements: kiosks, uncompleted 
buildings, pavement of shops and over crowded houses of relatives 
(Yeboah and Appiah-Yeboah, 2009, p.3). Currently, there are about 5.4 
million slum dwellers (Boakye, 2006). Given that the rate of slum formation is 
1.83 per cent (UN-Habitat, 2004), an extrapolation of the current figures 
suggest that the size of the slum population in Ghana may double in four 
decades from now. Meanwhile, about 85 per cent of the active population 
in Ghana works in the informal economy. Of this, about 60 per cent work in 
cities and towns (ICFTU, 2004). These include artisans, hairdressers, tailors and 
cobblers. In the discussion of informal economy in this paper, however, the 
emphasis is on those who hawk goods on pavements or streets and sell their 
wares in informal market places4.  
 
Most people who work in the informal economy also live in slums: and 
most slum dwellers work in the informal sector.  In Accra, it is estimated 
                                                 
4 It is hard to know the size of people in this cohort. Some studies in Accra suggest that 
one alliance of street vendors’ associations has a membership of about 6,000. But there 
are numerous vendors who remain unrecorded (Brown et al, 2009). The lack of records on 
the informal economy has severe implications for tax collection. Out of a total of about 5 
million people who should  pay income tax, only 1 million people actually pay it (Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, 2007). 
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that about 60 per cent of the population live and work in slums (Grant and 
Nijman, 2004). In Kumasi, about 45 per cent of under aged informal 
workers live in slum conditions (Tipple and Speak, 2009, p.152). Samuel 
Afrane, a planner and member of the National Development Planning Commission 
of Ghana (cited in Atafori, 2007), has confirmed that, in terms of spatial 
distribution, there is a concentration of informal workers in slums. This 
connectedness of ‘home’ and ‘work’ underscores the importance of 
examining forced evictions as an issue bearing on social and economic 
wellbeing. It also indicates the need for contextualising the significance 
of the informal sector. 
 
 
 
The History of Informal Activity in Ghana 
 
The nature of rural-urban migration has contributed to the expansion and growth 
of slums in Ghana. From the beginning, land was tilled for food production which 
was used by the household and only a little of the harvest was reserved for 
exchange. How much land was tilled depended on the size of one’s family. 
However, the coming of Europeans and colonialism changed all of this. The 
demand for cocoa by Europeans led to the commercialisation of land. Families 
that could till more land were able to get more cash from the sale of cocoa. In 
turn, such families expanded their farms by using the services of hired labour.  
 
The effect of the new ‘cash economy’ was widespread. For instance, lured by the 
prospects of making more money, traditional authorities started selling land to 
strangers and natives alike. People with more money could get more land and, 
hence, more money. In turn, the practice of credit became more popular. The 
growing indigenous bourgeoisie lent money at high interest rates setting in 
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motion tendencies for mortgagors who defaulted to be pushed off their land or to 
abandon their land and migrate to cities. Not all migrants were originally 
engaged in cocoa farming, of course. Migrants from Northern, Volta, and Upper 
regions were more typically engaged in subsistence farming, focussing on food 
production. Nonetheless, they suffered similar pressures. The state offered more 
support to the production of cash crops (for export) and the industries that were 
set up mainly required cash crops as raw materials. These tendencies led to a rise 
in the demand for land for cash crop farming and a fall in the demand for land for 
traditional food crop production. In turn, peasants were forced to migrate to cities 
(Sandbrook and Arn, 1977, pp. 13-21; Howard, 1978; Howard, 1980; Austin, 
2005; Firmin-Sellers, 1996; Amanor, 2001; 2005; 2006). 
 
There were pull factors too. People in rural areas perceived life in cities to be 
more attractive than in the country (Caldwell, 1969). This perception was 
strengthened by the disproportionate investment in cities over time. Economic 
liberalisation made it possible for investment to be poured into already 
‘developed’ parts of cities like Accra (Benjamin, 2007). In 2004, for example, 
Greater Accra alone was home to 78.70 per cent of the 1,282 investment projects 
registered by the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (see CHF International, 
2004). The combination of rural push factors and urban pull factors lubricated the 
migration of people to cities in search of jobs (CHF International, 2004). 
 
The influence of neoliberalism is also significant.  Neoliberalism is a 
concept that has multiple interpretations. It is used in this paper to 
connote two sets of policies. First are policies by the colonial state that: 
(a) hastened the rate of rural-urban migration because of concentrating 
most economic activities in few cities; and (b) reduced opportunities in 
rural areas. Second is a set of policies (sometimes dictated by 
international forces) implemented by the municipal, metropolitan and 
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national state authorities to promote private sector investment and 
disinterest in creating more public sector jobs5.  
 
 
The state encouraged private sector-led housing to cater for the increasing 
pressure on housing (Arku, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2009a; Asiedu and Arku, 
2009). Corporate tax has been reduced from 55 per cent to 45 per cent; a 5-year 
tax holiday has been given to private real estate developers; houses bought from 
private developers have been exempted from Stamp Duty payments; and 
companies are allowed to reinvest part of their profit to offset up to 50 per cent of 
such investments against the subsequent year’s liability (Asiedu and Arku, 2009, 
pp.231-232). These policies have led to the building of more private sector 
housing estates, as shown in figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Private Estate Development in Ghana, 1995 - 2004
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5 This latter policy has a long history in Ghana. Its formal features were first 
recognized after 1966 when the Nkrumah government was overthrown by the 
National Liberation Council. Subsequent governments (both military and civilian) 
did not have overriding commitment to public sector development. Indeed, some, 
such as the Busia government (1969 – 1972), were significantly pro-market. The 
government led by Jerry Rawlings (1981 – 2000) was, perhaps, the most 
committed to some aspects of social democracy. However, local, national and 
international economic problems forced him to embrace structural adjustment 
policies.  From this perspective, it is clear that Neoliberalism has a very long 
history in Ghana.  
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  Source: Arku (2009, p.266) 
 
However, these houses are expensive relative to incomes. In Accra, for example, 
two bedroom houses are priced in the range of US$30,000 to US$60,000 
depending inter alia on location, type of building finishes and type of house (e.g. 
detached and semi detached houses). Most Ghanaians cannot afford these 
private sector houses6. Currently, about 31 per cent of the population lives under 
US$1.25 a day (Otchere-Darko, 2009) and 80 per cent of them live under US$2 a 
day (Gary, 2009). The average house price/income ratio in Accra (14.0) is high 
compared to the average in African cities (12.5) (UN-Habitat, 1998). Out of 26 
cities for which the UN-Habitat had data in 2003, only 5 (Abidjan, Tanta, 
Monrovia, Maputo and Jinja) had a higher house price/income ratio than Accra, 
and only 6 cities (Abidjan, Tanta, Monrovia, Maputo, Jinja and Antananarivo) had 
a higher house price/income ratio than Kumasi (11.6), Ghana’s second largest 
city (UN-Habitat, 2003). Rental housing also raises major problems of 
affordability, given that landlords demand large advance payments (typically 
between 2-3 years) (Obeng-Odoom, 2009a).   
 
The harsh housing environment makes ‘informal’ housing attractive. However, 
while cheap, informal housing provides conditions for slum growth. This tendency 
is exacerbated by the policy of extending market forces into the management 
of waste. When the management of waste is in the hands of the private sector, 
as is becoming the dominant pattern in Ghana, the collection of waste is done 
on a for-profit basis, so households who cannot afford to pay for waste 
collection have to live in filth.  As shown in Table 1, these dynamics have 
become evident in Ghana where only few low income neighbourhoods have their 
waste collected. The principal exception to the strong association between 
                                                 
6 Housing surveys in Accra by the American Geographer, Richard Grant (2009), show that 
these houses are usually purchased by expatriates and Ghanaians who have lived overseas 
for sometime, popularly called ‘burgers’.   
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residential status and waste collection is in the relatively low coverage in East 
Legon, however, and deserves explanation. Unlike Airport and Cantonments 
which were specifically developed by government for high class civil servants and 
the affluent, East Legon was privately developed by rich individuals. Therefore, 
there are still some poor earlier settlers in the area whose waste is not collected 
(Agyei-Mensah and Owusu, 2009).  
 
 
Table 1 Waste collection according to socio-economic status in parts of 
Accra during the recent (2000) population and housing census in Ghana 
Residential 
Neighbourhoods 
Collected Solid Waste Disposal 
System   (%) 
Migrant low-class 
neighbourhood  
Nima 8.6 
Sabon Zongo 15.1 
Accra New Town 25.3 
    
Indigenous low-class 
neighbourhood   
James Town 11.0 
Chorkor Down 2.9 
Nungua 4.6 
    
Middle-class neighbourhood   
Asylum Down 86.0 
Teshie-Nungua Estate - 
Adabraka 52.9 
    
High-class neighbourhood   
Airport 74.5 
Cantonments 71.1 
East Legon 31.4 
    
Accra (city-wide average) 20.8 
  Source: Agyei-Mensah and Owusu (2009) 
 
 
These inequalities in living conditions reflect the history of migrants and 
poor people being forced to live in areas where housing is poor and municipal 
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services are inadequately provided. The exact chronology of events that led to 
the growth of these settlements could differ. Some of these settlements sprang 
up on public land to accommodate migrants; others were originally not slums but 
degenerated into slums; some others were semi-permanent settlements that 
sprang up around already constructed ‘regular’ housing estates and the rest 
started as impermanent settlements that sprang up around housing estates 
whose construction is ongoing (Grant, 2009, pp. 116-117).   
 
The biggest slum in Ghana is in the Agbobloshie area, in the central part of Accra, 
where there are about 40,000 slum dwellers. The area is made up of two types of 
slums: one settled ‘illegally’ and the other allowed to degenerate into a slum 
(Grant, 2009). The latter, Agbobloshie, named after the Agboglo shrine, is a 
conglomerate of markets where foodstuffs and other commodities are sold. It is 
home to some offices of the municipal government and has about 15,000 people, 
many of whom have title to land (Grant, 2009).  
 
The former, called Old Fadama or derogatively labelled Sodom and Gomorrah, is 
sometimes called the ‘most polluted place on earth’ (Benjamin, 2007). Old 
Fadama was established in 1979 by migrants and internally displaced persons 
from Northern Ghana. The migrants came to seek work but experienced severe 
hardships in the form of high price housing and food, inflation and inadequate 
wages (Hart, 1973) that forced them to squat on (cheap) public land. The slum 
expanded when the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) relocated hawkers there 
in 1991 in a bid to rid the city of them and further expanded in 1993 when AMA 
moved the yam market (and, in effect, the sellers) there. These sellers used 
wood, mud and concrete to build shacks for themselves (CHF International, 
2007). Currently, the area has about 24,165 residents, including 11, 485 
women, and 5,285 children (Slum Dwellers International [SDI], 2009) though this 
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number varies by night, day and season because of the in and out flow of people 
(Grant, 2009).  
 
This history of slums shows their close connections with the informal 
economy where many of the slum dwellers make a living. The relationship 
between these two phenomena is not one of simple linear cause and 
effect: rather, it is a relationship of interdependence. So strong is this 
interrelationship that people who live in slums are sometimes denied 
jobs in the formal economy mainly because of where they live. The 
fieldwork in Nima by Owusu and his colleagues (2008, p.185) revealed 
these tendencies, including an in-depth interview that revealed that 
‘Many young people in Nima are being frustrated on the job market 
simply because they are from Nima’. Therefore, when discussing 
evictions, it is crucial to consider not only slums but also the informal 
economy, how it arose, how it operates and how it is perceived by the 
state. 
 
The Development of the Informal Economy 
The reasons for the growth of the informal economy continue to be 
vigorously debated. The principal polarised positions are those of the so called 
Dualists and Structuralists. The former argue that the sector arises during periods 
of economic slowdown. That is, with poor economic growth people are likely to 
work in the informal economy and then exit it during high growth periods. 
Therefore, to Dualists, the informal economy is transient and rises and falls with 
economic growth. Structuralists share the view that the informal economy aids 
economic growth and supports the livelihood of its workers. However, 
Structuralists argue that informal work is an integral part of the capitalist society. 
It is, therefore, not temporary. Contrary to the view by Dualists, Structuralists 
argue that economic growth within a capitalist society causes the informal 
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economy to expand because that sector provides cheap labour and other 
resources/raw materials for the accumulation of capital in the formal economy 
(Mensah, 2006; Potts, 2007). As we shall see, the Structuralist conception of the 
informal economy better explains the Ghanaian case. 
 
As with slums, the informal economy has its roots in rural capitalism and owes its 
expansion to municipal neoliberalism. Many of those who were pushed out or 
attracted to the cities could not find jobs in the formal sector and in order to 
survive performed useful but poorly paid services to those in the formal sector.  
 
The sector swelled during the 1980s when, as part of the Economic Reform 
Program (ERP) in Ghana, the public sector was downsized and the public service 
began to be managed along private sector lines emphasising efficiency and cost 
recovery. This New Public Management (NPM), as these policies were collectively 
called (see Larbi, 1999 for a discussion of other aspects of NPM), led to a 
dramatic reduction in the share of public sector employment.  
 
The burgeoning informal sector has a longer history that goes back further than 
the 1980s, of course. Nevertheless, several writers about cities in Ghana (e.g. 
UN-Habitat, 2009; Owusu et al., 2008; Otiso and Owusu, 2008; Kendie, 1998; 
Arthur, 1991) agree that the growth of the informal sector has been more rapid 
in the last 20 years. Two classic surveys about migrant experiences in cities in 
Ghana in the 1960s (Caldwell, 1969, see, in particular pp.171 - 184) and the 
1970s (Peil, 1972, pp.157-177) showed that migrants were not particularly 
concerned about informality. Rather, their concerns were more about the high 
cost of living in cities vis-à-vis rural areas and instances of overcrowding 
(without the additional characteristics of slums such as lack of proper sanitation 
and the provision of potable water). These findings are consistent with the global 
audit of slum conditions by the United Nations Human Settlement Program (UN-
Habitat, 2003) which found that, although slums have always been seen by urban 
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planners as a problem, the phenomenon intensified in the 1990s (see, UN-
Habitat, 2003, especially p. XXV, ‘key findings’). 
 
Between 1985 and 1991, formal sector employment reduced at an average 
annual rate of 3.7 per cent (Baah-Boateng, 2004). Between 1987 and 2000, over 
300 state enterprises were sold, resulting in a reduction in formal sector 
employment from 18 per cent in 1989 to 13 per cent in 1999. Some 70,000 
people lost their jobs in the formal economy (Adu-Amankwa, 2007). Others 
were also redeployed to other sectors of the public service and lost, as a 
result, about 27-48 per cent of their initial income depending on whether 
they were entitled to the payment of severance package (Alderman et 
al., 1995). Women employees were strongly affected: in 1987, for example, 
they constituted 31.7 per cent of those who lost their jobs (The Statesman, 
2007). A few of those people who lost their jobs found jobs in the private 
formal economy; most of them did not, so they had to work in the 
informal economy. As a result, many people who hitherto were decently 
employed were forced into the burgeoning informal sector where they made a 
living by hawking various goods like dog chains, water and foodstuff (Baah-
Boateng, 2004; Obeng-Odoom, 2009a).  
 
Currently, the public sector employs 28.8 per cent of the labour force; the 
formal private sector employs 18.9 per cent of the labour force; civil 
society organisations and diplomatic missions employ 1.5 per cent of the 
labour force and the private informal economy accounts for about 51 per 
cent of the total work force in Ghana. The distribution of jobs in the 
urban economy is similar to what pertains in the national economy: 30. 9 
per cent of urban workers are employed in the public sector; 17.5 per 
cent work in the formal private sector; 1.9 per cent work for civil society 
organisations and diplomatic missions and, analogous to the (45 per 
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cent) share of urban population who live in slums in Ghana, 45.9 per cent 
of urban workers are engaged in activities in the informal economy 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2008). 
 
 
There are some within the sector who make as much income as those in the 
formal sector and could eventually move into the formal sector with the 
accumulation of more capital (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). However, the 
informal economy workers have to work under poor conditions, like long hours 
and severe weather conditions, to obtain about US$ 2 a day (Asiedu and Agyei-
Mensah, 2008). Despite positive economic growth in Ghana over the last decade, 
the informal economy has continued to expand at a rate of about 5.6 per annum, 
compared to less than 1 per cent in the formal sector (Barwa, 1995, p.4).  
 
The analysis suggests that, though the Dualist explanation does help in explaining 
how some people in the informal economy ‘filter up’ the employment ladder, 
the permanence of the sector and its expansion show that the Structuralist 
view better explains the rise and nature of the informal economy in Ghana. 
Moreover, a significant number of those who work in the informal 
economy are those who cannot afford to live in ‘formal’ housing because 
of poverty aggravated by multiple factors such as job losses during 
economic adjustment. Agbobloshie and Fadama are cases in point. These 
are areas that are inhabited mainly by migrants and those who lost their 
jobs in the formal sector. These people have to work ‘informally’ and live 
‘informally’ in slum conditions because of their economic conditions. 
These dynamics make it crucial that studies of the informal sector in 
Ghana recognise the interdependence of home and work, a dynamic that 
the next section of this paper seeks to further clarify. 
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Recent Role of The State 
 
In order to remedy the problem of informality, the state has taken what one 
Member of Parliament called ‘machoistic’ approach (Mensah, 2009) where an 
aggressive, combative and impulsive stance is taken against slum dwellers and 
workers in the informal economy. These attacks are directed at both the 
home and work of this stratum of urban citizens. That is, state 
institutions attack both slums and the informal economy. The timing of 
these attacks is often triggered by events such as anniversaries and 
preparation for visits by dignitaries.  In one case, stalls at Spintex road in Accra 
were set ablaze by officials at AMA in order to beautify the city to welcome 
President Obama (Joy FM, 2009a). In other cases, people in the informal 
sector were evicted in advance of visits by international dignitaries 
during the country’s Golden Jubilee celebrations in 2007 to mark 50 
years of independence from British colonial rule. 
 
In Kumasi, the attacks were, perhaps, most vicious during the 23 year reign (or, 
rather, ruin) of Mayor Akwasi Agyemang7. Popularly known as ‘Butcher of Kumasi’ 
or ‘Terror of Kumasi’ or ‘Okumkom’, he was notoriously disrespectful to all but 
was particularly harsh in his treatment of workers in the informal economy, 
such as cobblers, market women and taxi drivers (Ellison, 2002; Daily Guide, 
2002). So despotic was his reign that, eventually, the Kumasi Metropolitan 
Assembly petitioned the president to remove him as mayor of Kumasi (Joy FM, 
1999). Subsequent mayors in Kumasi have been less tyrannical but they have all 
periodically evicted hawkers - with force. 
 
                                                 
7 He served first as District Commissioner and later as mayor. He left office when the NDC 
lost power in 2001 having been mayor in different governments since 1979. 
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In Accra, the modus operandi has also been ‘machoistic’, though more regularly 
done and often with little or no forewarning. As one observer has noted: 
 
Concealed by the darkness of an early Monday morning, without warning of 
any kind and protected by dangerous-looking heavyweights, Accra 
Municipality [sic] Assembly authorities led by Mayor Alfred Vanderpuye [sic] 
descended on the stalls of Kaneshie Market street traders. The team 
proceeded to destroy the traders’ stalls, many still containing valuable wares 
ready for sale, wreaking havoc and overturning the more fire-resistant 
structures. Refusing to provide sufficient explanation to the small group of 
understandably irate traders that had gathered, the demolition team left the 
site looking like a war-zone, the traders’ possessions transformed into 
smoking rubble (Mayson, 2009). 
 
The brute force used for these ‘decongestion’ exercises makes the 
authorities unwilling for anybody to publicise these acts: journalists that try to 
cover the forced evictions could incur the displeasure of the authorities. Such was 
evidently the case when a Joy FM broadcast journalist and a reporter from Radio 
Gold were assaulted by the AMA taskforce when they tried to cover the story of 
one recent demolition. According to the Joy FM reporter, ‘All of a sudden, I saw 
four men approach me. While one ran his hands off my face, another slapped me. 
The third person put his hands in my pocket and picked my wallet’ (Koomson, 
2009).  
 
Considerable public revenues have been spent on these exercises8. One of 
such forced evictions in Kumasi is estimated to have cost the government 150, 
                                                 
8 In some instances, the authorities have tried to recover the cost of forced eviction from 
poor traders through court fines imposed on them for defying the order of the authorities. 
From the Revenue and Expenditure budgets of KMA, hawkers alone (that is excluding other 
informal workers) contributed about 246 million new Ghana cedis between 2006 and 2008 
which means that the authorities would lose that money if they succeeded in preventing 
people from hawking their wares. 
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000 new Ghana cedis in 2008 (Tawiah, 2009) and 209,850.02 new Ghana cedis 
in 2007 (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2009). Another estimate in Accra in 2009 put 
the figure at 140, 000 excluding ‘the demolition of structures in waterways’ 
(Ghanaian Times, 2009).  
 
It is useful to ask why all this money should be spent on evicting people when it 
could be spent improving the living conditions of the ‘victims’? Although the 
mode of destroying the informal economy and slums is similar, the 
justification for the attacks differs between the informal economy and slums. In 
the former case, informal economy workers are accused of making cities 
ugly and causing congestion. Hence the attacks to rid the city of them are 
labelled ‘decongestion’ exercises, said to be aimed at ‘beautifying’ the city 
or, in the case of Accra, making it a ‘Millennium City’ (Devas and Korboe, 
2003;Obeng-Odoom, 2009c; Gadugah, 2009a). In the case of slums, officials 
claim that they are the breeding grounds for crime and grime. According to an 
editorial in The Statesman newspaper of 21st July, 2006: 
 
Not only do such communities create an eyesore to the individual and the 
state, it also breeds criminals and anti-social elements because of the 
population problems attending it and the lack of facilities they engender. 
…..[these sharks are] synonymous with illicit sex, crime and drug abuse. It 
has always bred armed robbers, prostitutes, child labourers and violence. 
Police raids in the area, problems of poor sanitation and poverty and drudgery 
are a daily ritual, because of the environment and because of the unstable 
social setting.   
 
Of course, there are some criminals in slums; but so are there criminals in 
‘regular’ settlements. There is no systematic research to show the distribution of 
crime in different neighbourhoods. The existing studies are not disaggregated to 
the settlement level to permit a neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood comparison 
either. Studies of the nature of crime in Accra by Appiahene-Gyamfi (2007; 2003; 
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1998) have consistently shown that crime is found among the uneducated, the 
unemployed and mostly single men between the ages of 18 and 36 with no fixed 
addresses. These characteristics fit the people in the slums but there are many 
other people with these characteristics that do not live in slums. Many of the 
people in slums are of good behaviour because, as some studies (e.g. Obeng-
Odoom, 2009b; UN-Habitat, 2003) in a different context suggest, the existence of 
social controls such as fear of a bad name in the community serves as a check on 
anti social behaviour.  
 
Many people in slums and the informal economy carry out indispensable tasks to 
keep the wheels of urban economic growth turning through the provision of food, 
labour and market for activities in the more formal sectors of the city economy 
(UN-Habitat, 2003). Some are involved in catering, batik making, tie/dye, 
beadsmaking and hairdressing (see Ansa-Koi, 2009).  It is estimated that ‘…85 
per cent of the people in Old Fadama work for their livelihood and their main 
sources of employment is the market’ (Benjamin, 2007). Indeed, the Minister of 
Employment and Social Welfare, Stephen Kwao, has noted that the informal 
economy contributes about 40 per cent of national income in Ghana (Ghana News 
Agency, 2010). When we consider all this, the claim that slums dwellers are 
mainly criminals begins to look shaky. As one slum dweller puts it, ‘We are not 
saying it is crime-free, [but] it is painful to hear the Minister address us as 
criminals’ (Yankson, 2009).  
 
It could be argued that, even if the attacks on the slum do not address existing 
crime, it could send strong signals to discourage dwellers contemplating it. But do 
forced evictions pre-empt crime in Ghana? There is no evidence to support this 
view. Rather, it could be contended that, by its activities, the state is sowing and 
spreading the seeds of criminality. What happens to thousands of people without 
homes and jobs unleashed into the urban environment? Assuming there were 
 25 
criminals in the slums, would crime be abated by removing the ‘criminals’ from 
one spot, dispossessing them of their jobs and homes and spreading them across 
the whole city?  
 
In fairness to the state, it sometimes provides alternative sites for those evicted. 
However, in almost all cases, these sites are unsuitable. For instance, the 
government claims that it has provided alternative arrangement to house these 
squatters in areas like Adzen Kotoku and Amasamang but, according to the 
Director of the Metro Public Health Department of the AMA, the new places can 
accommodate only 3,000 people. Also, the Amasamang site is reported to be the 
research site for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) which 
has warned that the site is not habitable because of the presence of diseases 
(arising from scientific experiments) which could be passed on from livestock 
to humans (Joy News, 2009b). Furthermore, out of 852 stalls needed to relocate 
traders in Ashaiman, the city authorities only provided 282 (The Ghanaian 
Chronicle, 2010). This inadequacy makes it ‘rational’ for the traders to try to 
hawk their wares in ‘unauthorised places’. There is, of course, the more structural 
reason that it is the most congested areas where business is most brisk. The 
land use pattern in the cities which attracts traffic to particular routes and 
localities is at the root of this problem. It is these dynamics that has led Boadi-
Danquah (2009) to correctly predict that ‘Accra can never be decongested’. 
 
How do the city authorities respond to these concerns with the alternative sites 
provided by the state? Generally, they are insensitive to the concerns. One 
director at AMA recently told the Daily Graphic that ‘the government is not under 
any obligation to relocate the squatters’. Government is simply being 
magnanimous to the slum dwellers (Jafaru, 2009). The mayor of Accra is also 
reported to have said that evictees will not be compensated and cannot be 
guaranteed relocation, though transport will be given to any slum dweller who 
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requests it (Ghana News Agency [GNA], 2009). This stance by the state raises 
the question of how forced evictions have impacted the livelihoods of 
‘victims’. 
One useful way to answer the question is to use the Sustainable Livelihood 
Framework (SLF) developed by the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) (DFID, 1999). The SLF asserts that the assets of people can be 
looked at from five different standpoints that collectively form the Asset 
Pentagon: Physical (P), Social (S), Natural (N), Financial (F) and Human (H).  
Physical Assets come in the form of infrastructure (like roads, buildings, clean 
water and sanitation), tools and technology (farm implements, equipment, seeds 
and pesticides). Human Capital is, inter alia, in the form of education, good health 
and skills. Natural Capital connotes assets like secure access to land. Social 
Capital signifies the networks people have, their families and associations to 
which they belong. Finally, Financial capital comes in the form of money or its 
equivalent, be it money saved or regular inflow of money. These assets are 
directly influenced by shocks (like natural disasters and political instability), 
seasonality (like population change and oil prices or food prices) and longer-
term trends (like economic and national/international political trends). Figure 2 
shows the posited interrelationships. 
 
Figure 2: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
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Source: DFID 1999 
 
 
This diagrammatic representation shows that assets influence and are 
influenced by government policies, institutions, culture, the private sector and 
laws. These government policies, institutions and laws together with the 
influences of the private sector and culture have a bearing on the shocks, 
trends and seasonality. It is the interactions among them that determine which 
strategies people use to produce livelihood outcomes such as expanded 
incomes. These livelihood outcomes determine the size/shape of the asset 
pentagon (DFID 1999). 
 
Using this framework, Mensah (2006) has shown that the confrontational style of 
the city authorities in Kumasi has made slum dwellers and informal workers more 
vulnerable through shocks and these have, in turn, affected the assets of the 
victims in the form of poor sanitation, loss in money from destruction of goods, 
disruption of social contacts, fear of eviction and consequent insecure tenure and 
poor health. The resulting problems range from shelter losses to livelihood 
deprivation, a loss in either of which has implications for the other. 
Hence, eviction of slum dwellers is organically related to the eviction of 
 28 
informal workers. It is useful to analyse how these victims respond to these 
attacks and their effects on their livelihoods. 
 
 
Recent Encounters between ‘Informal People’ and the State 
Victims of the forced evictions have used various strategies, including 
demonstrations, disobedience and adaptation strategies. Some examples 
of each of these reactions are given below.  
 
In some instances, there have been demonstrations to protest forced evictions. 
Taxi drivers protested against tyrannical practices in Kumasi in the 1990s. In one 
of such protests, the mayor pulled a gun on the taxi drivers. To the surprise of 
the mayor, the taxi drivers charged at him, forcing him to flee for cover in a 
nearby house. In another instance, that same mayor ordered that the house of a 
political opponent be demolished. When protestors marched to his office 
seeking to get him to rescind his decision, he pulled a gun and fired a 
warning shot to threaten them. Instead of fleeing, however, the protestors 
charged at him, disarmed him and set his vehicle ablaze. Again, he took to his 
heels (Aryittey, 1999, p.182).  
 
In Accra, thousands of head potters known locally as kayayei staged a 
demonstration in September 2009 over a government threat to evict them from 
the slum colloquially called ‘Sodom and Gomorrah’. They even called a short 
strike not to convey any load in order to carry a strong message to government 
not to mistreat them. They carried placards with messages like ‘We are peaceful 
citizens’, “President Mills live up to your ‘I care for you’ promise”. According to 
their spokesman, they were appealing to government to desist from actions that 
would turn them into ‘refugees in their own country’ (Essel, 2009).  
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In other cases, traders have dared to disobey the authorities, refusing to 
move.  Such was the case on Saturday 21st November, 2009 when traders 
physically challenged AMA officials and sought to prevent them from carrying out 
the eviction exercise. The AMA officials were forced to halt the exercise though 
they claimed, when contacted by journalists, that they were only pausing to re-
strategise9. Later, more violent ejections took place, some starting at 4 am and 
carried out by heavily built men with the mayor as ‘commander-in-chief’. 
Incapable of physically challenging the team, the market women and youth threw 
stones at the mayor who also suffered obscene insults10 (Danso, 2009). Similar 
confrontations have taken place since that incident. On Thursday, February 18, 
2010, squatters and traders threw stones and other ‘deadly’ items at the police 
and AMA officials who were carrying out a demolition exercise at the Achimota old 
station, near the railways, in Accra. 30 people were injured in the clash, including 
two people - one policeman and one AMA official – who were nearly lynched. It 
took police reinforcement to rescue the ‘demolition squad’ (Essel, 2010; Twum, 
2010).  
 
These acts of disobedience reflect particular reasons for protest. Three of 
them are particularly evident. The first and foremost reason is that the victims 
have no alternative source of livelihood or accommodation. As some ‘returnees’ 
opined when asked by a journalist why they had returned despite the forced 
eviction, they said government should provide alternative jobs so that they would 
leave the streets (Gadugah, 2009b). This problem is accentuated by inter- 
generational pressure on some of these people. One study found that about 69 
                                                 
9 This information came from a news item on Joy Midday News on Saturday 21st 
November, 2009 and read by Bernard Nasara Saibu.  
10 One interesting area that future researchers could look at is how these workers 
organise.  Brown et al. (2009) suggest that some workers in the informal economy are 
highly organised with market queens (or leaders). From this, we could infer that some of 
these protests are planned. However, for other workers who join no associations, formal 
planning may not be the way they come to protest. It could be spontaneous ‘uprising’ 
or they follow the ‘leads’ of the more formal groups. More research on protest by 
informal workers would improve our understanding of these dynamics.  
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per cent have economic dependents (Asiedu and Agyei-Mensah, 2008). Endorsing 
the decision of the traders to return to the streets, one popular social 
commentator has observed that ‘[t]he structure [the city authorities] are putting 
up [for the evictees to relocate to] even pigs will not go there so why should 
Ghanaians go there? There is no toilet, no water, there is nothing so why should 
they go there[?]’ (Daabu, 2009) 
 
A second reason is the charge that the city authorities take bribes from them and 
confiscate assets illegally. One observer saw the security guards of the city 
authorities  ‘just snatching young peoples’[sic] wares, their phones, and just 
bunch them together and throw into their vehicle.’ Obviously frustrated by what 
he saw, he described it as ‘thuggery’ (Daabu, 2009). The mayor of Accra has 
expressed concern about such allegations, noting that ‘we do not want this to be 
an avenue for some people to enrich themselves’ (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 
2009). In Kumasi, the Mayor has recently interdicted a member of the 
‘decongestion’ team who is alleged to have extorted several thousand of cedis 
from traders. The matter has also been referred to the Bureau of National 
Investigations. The city authorities in Kumasi claim that, though they receive 
several allegations of extortion by members of the ‘decongestion’ team, most of 
them are unsubstantiated (Peprah, 2010). 
 
There are also allegations that the city authorities eject these informal workers 
only to re-allocate the same places to their own cronies. The chairman of the 
Ashaiman Peace Traders’ Association, for instance, has recently alleged that 
about 400 plots demarcated for stalls for members of the Association could not 
be accounted for by the city authorities. Officials have denied any wrongdoing but 
have assured the traders that they would be allocated plots elsewhere (The 
Ghanaian Chronicle, 2010). These allegations have been made by many other 
traders in James Town and Korle-Gorno in Accra (Joy FM, 2009c). Other cases of 
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corruption and fraud (or kuluulu, in local parlance) have been uncovered 
elsewhere (e.g. The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2009; Prempeh, 2008). 
 
A third reason for the protests is that the ‘victims’ feel they are being pushed 
out for bigger and more highly influential businesses or for the more privileged 
people in society to benefit. A recent case in Tema illustrates this. Squatters at 
Tema Community 3 Site ‘B’ are reported to have resisted attempts by the Tema 
Development Corporation to eject them for Korean investors to establish a sports 
stadium in the area which is legally marked out for the project (Daily Graphic, 
2010). 
 
For all these reasons, these ejections seldom have lasting impact. Evictees have 
often returned only few days after the forced evictions while the city authorities 
look on hopelessly (Gadugah, 2009b).  Resistance, however, comes with cost. 
The few assets these poor people have are often destroyed by the authorities.  
 
How then, have the poor adapted? To survive these forced evictions, the slum 
dwellers and informal economy workers have resorted to some distinctive 
strategies.  In Agbobloshie, for example, the slums dwellers operate a welfare 
package to support one another (Joy News, 2009d). Also there are about 55 
savings and housing schemes with a total membership close to 5, 000 (Braimah, 
2009). The residents have created 15 access roads for emergency vehicles and 
purchased drainage materials worth US$3,700 to improve drainage in the area. 
In addition, residents are monitoring the area to prevent the indiscriminate 
disposal of refuse and waste to enhance sanitation and drainage in the 
community (UN-Habitat, 2007). Furthermore, there have been efforts to organise 
and internationalise their activities. In this direction, there has been a lot of 
support from a host of local and international civil society organisations. Among 
them are People’s Dialogue on Human Settlements (PD), Centre on Housing 
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Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Ghana Federation for the Urban Poor (GHAFUP) 
and Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI). Through the activities of these civil 
society organisations some slum dwellers have challenged some of the forced 
evictions in the Ghanaian courts11, travelled to cities like Nairobi to exchange 
ideas with other slum dwellers about community organisation and urban 
rehabilitation (Grant, 2009; Braimah, 2009). These organisations are also 
involved in advocacy for, and enumeration of, the communities they work with. 
 
The evidence is clearly that municipal Neoliberalism, as practised in Ghana, 
creates more problems than it purports to solve. The effort by the state to rid the 
cities of the informal sector and the slums has failed. Slums and the Informal 
sector are manmade so they could be unmade (Yahya, 2006, p.121). However, 
attempting to unmake them through neoliberal policies intensifies and 
merely moves the problem around. This failure has clear echoes of the point 
made by Frederick Engels more than a century earlier when criticising the 
‘Hausmann’ strategy of clearing cities like Paris of slum dwellers. In the words of 
Engels (1872): 
 
… quite apart from whether this is done from considerations of public health 
and for beautifying the town, or owing to the demand for big centrally situated 
business premises, or owing to traffic requirements, such as the laying down 
of railway, streets etc. No matter how different the reasons may be, the result 
is everywhere the same: the scandalous alleys and lanes disappear to the 
accompaniment of lavish self-praise from the bourgeoisie on account of this 
tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere else and 
often in the immediate neighbourhood. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 The courts have so far been unsupportive of the arguments by COHRE which often rests 
its case on international human rights law including the right to adequate housing. That 
was evidently the case on 24th July, 2002 when the High Court, Accra ruled that the 
government was right in carrying out its planned evictions (See, for example, Thiele, 
2003).   
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Alternative Approaches 
The challenge of developing strategies to deal with slums and informal economic 
activities remains. Any attempt to overcome this challenge must recognise 
the close relationship between where informal workers earn their living 
and the nature of their accommodation. Broadly speaking, there are three 
strategies. The first emphasises a minimal government intervention and a largely 
community driven approach or, as some call it, a self-help approach to solving 
the problem. The second approach is the so called operational or practical 
approach of designing and putting up buildings, establishing businesses and 
trying to recreate the whole local environment. The third, and most radical, 
solution involves a more comprehensive assault on the underlying political 
economic problems of exploitation, inequality and poverty (Yahya, 2006, 
pp.146-147). It is useful to briefly reflect on each of these potential solutions in 
order to judge their relative effectiveness in tackling the informal sector debacle.  
 
The thinking that the solution to the problem of the informal sector as a whole is 
to leave it alone with minimal government intervention was popularised by the 
architect John Turner (Turner, 1976). Though Turner himself claimed that he 
subscribed to neither socialism nor capitalism, and, in turn, did not feel that 
scholars in either of these camps would agree with him (Turner, 1976, p.8), it is 
clear that his work is in tune with neoliberal policies and their underlying 
atomistic analysis. ‘Housing by people’ is not radically different from housing by 
markets. It is a ‘neoliberal wolf dressed up as a populist sheep’ (Berner and 
Phillips, 2005, p.20). The most persistent exponent of neoliberal development 
economics, the World Bank, actively promoted Turner’s ideas. Robert McNamara, 
who was president of the World Bank around the time that Turner’s work was 
published, and the staff of the Bank’s Urban Development Department actively 
promoted the idea (Davies, 2006) and supported such self-help projects with 
aid -  hence the name ‘aided self-help’ (Drakakis-Smith, 1986). It is a popular 
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option for government and the international development community because it 
is cheap and puts no pressure on government. Nonetheless, aided self help has 
formidable challenges. ‘Letting the poor be’ diverts and divests the state of the 
responsibility of providing public housing and thus accentuates housing-induced 
inequality. Also, the poor may not be able to develop enough decent housing for 
themselves. In Ghana, quasi self help housing projects are usually of poor 
quality and are not well maintained. In the case of the Habitat for Humanity 
Housing Scheme in Kumasi, for example, 80 per cent of the houses develop 
cracks soon after completion (Obeng-Odoom, 2008).   
 
The ‘practical approach’ consists of looking at the indicators of slums and trying 
to solve them one by one. It includes the formal registration of title to land, 
which is said to facilitate access to credit (De Soto, 2001) and subsidies to buy 
formal homes (Gilbert, 2007). It is the kind of solution often found in the 
international development reports and the one advocated by the UN in its 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As stated by the UN in its 2008 MDGs 
report: ‘Simple, low-cost interventions to correct these specific deficiencies would 
go a long way towards improving the lives of many slums dwellers’ (UN, 2008, p. 
43). The policy approach has its own challenges too. One arises from its 
‘public administration’ approach of correcting symptoms, not causes, of the 
problem. Many questions are left unresolved. Why do people have insecure 
tenure? Why is sanitation bad in slums? More crucially, it seems to be quiet on 
the informal economy and ignores the relationship between the two. Can one 
resolve slum problems without simultaneously addressing problems in the 
informal economy? In his magisterial study of third world cities, the eminent 
development geographer, David Drakakis-Smith, put it simply but clearly when 
he argued that ‘…it is not possible to understand the nature of squatter or slum 
settlements on the basis of their appearance. Slums, in particular, because of 
their central location, tend to be characterized by very close economic ties with 
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the central business districts and frequently house many family businesses’ 
(Drakakis-Smith, 1987, p.94).   
 
A more radical approach derives from the Marxist tradition. It asserts that the 
root cause of the twin problem of the street economy and the slum is the class 
nature of the housing question. Those who stand to gain from the status quo such 
as financial institutions offering mortgages, developers, landlords and the owners 
of capital, defend it, but those who aspire to better their wretched conditions of 
life would normally want to overthrow that system. As Engels (1872) 
originally argued: 
 
In order to make an end of this housing shortage there is only one means: to 
abolish altogether the exploitation and oppression of the working class by the 
ruling class. What is meant today by housing shortage is the peculiar 
intensification of the bad housing conditions of the workers….And this housing 
shortage gets talked of so much only because it does not limit itself to the 
working class but has affected the petty bourgeoisie also.  
 
As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it is folly to 
hope for an isolated solution of the housing question or of any other social 
question affecting the fate of the workers. The solution lies in the abolition of 
the capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of all the means of life 
and labor by the working class itself. 
 
This implies a change in how production is organised in society, from one in which 
the means of production are held by individuals, to one in which production is 
socially managed. This would mean that all people have work and they have a 
say in what is produced, how much is produced and for whom it is produced. That 
is, there would be comprehensive workplace democracy. In terms of housing, it 
could mean the abolition of other tenures apart from public housing. 
Democratic community processes would then determine what type of 
housing is needed in the community and which facilities are needed. It is a 
 36 
project of social management that would not mark the end of the rights to 
private life but would strengthen the social unit for communal living (Cowley, 
1979, p.146). Under a socially managed economy, there would be more co-
operation between and among individuals and, in turn, the society would 
gravitate towards more equality.  
 
These ideals may look utopian, naive and, even, ‘impractical’.  Proponents 
argue that if they do, it may be because of the stark inequalities, selfishness, 
greed and individualness that the capitalist mode of production currently 
imposes and encourages (Cowley, 1979, p.147). It may appear naive because 
of the propaganda that a ‘tragedy’ awaits all communal ownership, echoing the 
highly influential but historically misleading theory of the tragedy of the commons 
(See the numerous cases that disprove this ‘tragedy’ in Ostrom, 1990).  
 
However, the Marxist approach has its own problems too. One of them is that 
collective decision-making is time consuming. When decision making is in the 
hands of a few individuals, as in when developers unilaterally decide what type of 
housing a whole community needs, it is much quicker to arrive at ‘solutions’. 
Participatory approaches to community planning, as in when a decision has to be 
made by members of the community, normally take more time. Also, the concept 
of ‘community’ itself is problematic. As Erhard Berner and Benedict Phillips asked 
in one of their papers in Community Development Journal: does ‘the community’ 
mean everyone, the majority, the men, older ones, the more eloquent or the well 
built ones? (Berner and Phillips, 2005, p.23). There are other problems. To bring 
about social management, there is the need for a complete change from the 
existing capitalist system. This rupture will not come about without a struggle. 
That struggle needs solidarity but how easily can this solidarity be obtained? 
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Take the case of slums. The slum dwellers do not constitute a homogenous 
group. There are the poor entrepreneurs and the very poor. Expressions like 
‘informal petty bourgeoisie’ and ‘informal proletariat’ have been used by several 
researchers to describe the class nature of informality. Increasing competition 
and decreasing co-operation may be observed in the slums, leading to the 
erosion of solidarity in the slums (Davies, 2006). As Drakakis-Smith (1987) 
argued, it is wrong to view the informal sector, en masse, as revolutionary. 
However, it is also wrong to think of the sector as conservative, stricto sensu, 
given the evidence of disobedience, demonstration and squatting that we have 
already discussed.  
 
So what is the practical way forward? Some aspects of the socialist alternative 
are practical. There is nothing as practical as knowing the structural causes of the 
contradictions within the informal sector and, subsequently, advocating the 
extinction of such causes. The question then should be, ‘what are the 
intermediate steps to be taken towards the ideal?’ 
 
It is a question on which institutional and Neo-Marxist political economists have 
provided much insight.  Michael Kalecki (1990), for example, argued that full 
employment is possible provided government wills and plans to employ every 
available labour power. Opposition to full employment, Kalecki argued, arises 
because businesses may fear a loss of profit, if the sack can no longer be used to 
discipline labour. Also, the social position of the boss is likely to be reduced in 
such a situation. However, the state could be pressured to provide full 
employment. That is, the government of Ghana could provide full employment 
through public investment (in sectors such as, schools, hospitals and affordable 
housing), public subsidies through borrowing (spent on subsidising necessary 
goods, family allowances etc) and active redistribution of wealth from the rich to 
the poor (through policies such as tax on undeveloped land) (Kalecki, 1990). By 
 38 
taking a leading role in directly providing housing and employment, the state 
could better address informality. Ensuring secure tenure would mean the 
freedom from fear of forced eviction either from a slum or the streets (UN-
Habitat, 2007). In these ways, the government could find better use for 
public revenue than using it to make life unbearable for the poor. 
 
This conclusion indicates the need for a transitional arrangement, whereby 
stronger state support and public expenditure is diverted from ‘social control’ to 
redress the root causes of poverty that underpin slums and informal economic 
sector activities. The emphasis should be jointly on the two phenomena. As 
this article has sought to demonstrate, there is a robust link between the 
two, and the agenda for reform should see slums and the informal 
economy as similarly closely related. By the same token, it is important 
to acknowledge that the features of the state that have been described in 
this paper stand in the way of embracing the more progressive policies. The 
politics of change, therefore, has to consider whether the organisation of 
the informal sector can put pressure on the state to set in motion a 
‘struggle in and against the state’ to dismantle or weaken its capitalistic 
or bureaucratic aspects (see, for example, Stilwell, 2006, p.237-238 for a 
general discussion of such struggles).  
 
The economic journalist, Philip Mattera (1985, pp.124-127), pointed out 
that there are several problems with organising people in the informal 
economy. First, they tend to be dispersed and heterogeneous. Second, 
some of the informal economy workers may be afraid of being detected 
or evicted if they are seen to be involved in ‘revolutionary’ activities. 
Third, a self delusion of being self-employed could make them 
disinterested in collective organisation. Nonetheless, recent efforts by 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) of Ghana to empower the informal 
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sector workers by developing ‘a manual for legal and social protection for 
workers in the informal sector’ (Awuah, 2010) brings some hope.  
 
However, the TUC seems to be assuming that informal sector workers are 
exploited only by other ‘bosses’. Because of that, the TUC is primarily concerned 
with empowering workers against their employers. While this strategy may work 
in the formal sector and for informal workers employed by others, the majority of 
hawkers, market women and dog chain sellers in the informal sector are ‘self-
employed’. Their exploitatation is, therefore, caused by the entire system. 
Additionally, TUC focuses mainly on the ‘economics’ of the problem without 
looking at the other two aspects – physical housing conditions and legal tenure - 
of the three-dimensional problem of informality.  
 
It seems that the hope for exerting pressure on the state does not lie ‘outside’ 
the ranks of the ‘victims’ of forced evictions, but, within them, in the reactions to 
the instances of forced evictions analysed in this paper. It is these tensions and 
contradictions that could potentially lead to a remedy of the dehumanising 
conditions in the slums and the informal economy, two organically linked 
aspects of the informal sector.  
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